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Abstract
This paper argues that assortative matching may explain over-
education. Education determines individuals’ income and, due to the
presence of assortative matching, the quality of the partner, who can
be a colleague or a spouse. Thus an individual acquires some educa-
tion to improve the expected partner’s quality. But since everybody
does that, the partner’s quality does not increase and over-education
emerges. Tax progression to correct over-education has ambiguous ef-
fects on the educational incentives according to the individuals’ abil-
ity. We test the model using the British Household Panel Survey. The
empirical results support our theoretical findings.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, the level of educational attainment in developed countries
has surpassed the skill requirements of available jobs1. This phenomenon is
known as “over-education”. There is a large empirical literature measuring
over-education, while this paper aims to contribute to a theoretical under-
standing of it.
We propose a possible explanation for the existence of over-education
based on the idea that acquiring education has two main effects. First, it
improves job conditions: income, job quality, and so on. Second, it may
influence the quality of future colleagues and spouses.
Schools and universities are among the places where people create their
own social networks, make friends and spend a considerable part of their
youth. At school, individuals can meet their future colleagues. For instance,
school or university mates can apply to the same company, decide to work in
partnership or find themselves working in the same firm. Also, many people
meet their spouse at school2. Colleagues and spouses who met at school share
similar levels of education3. We refer to this positive correlation as “assorta-
tive matching”4. Assortative matching reflects similarities in innate ability,
1Vaisey (2006) shows evidence that a substantial and growing number of American
workers are over-qualified for their jobs along the period 1972-2002. The principal time-
trend is positive and linear, and appears to be the result of the widening gap between a
large expansion in educational attainment and only modest increases in job educational
requirements over the past three decades. Budria and Moro-Egido (2007) find same ev-
idence in European countries and a negative differential in salary between over-qualified
individuals and their well-matched counterparts.
2Stevens (1991) analysed the reasons of why spouses tend to have similar educational
levels. In the sample considered, more than 50% of spouses attended the same school,
college or university.
3Some evidence of the positive relation in the education of colleagues can be found in
Barth, (2002) and Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003). There is a large empirical evidence on
the positive relationship in spouses’ education. Some important contributions are Kalmijn
(1991a, 1991b), Mare (1991), Pencavel (1998), Quian (1998), Qian and Preston (1993);
Smits et al. (2000), Schwartz and Mare (2005).
4The expression “assortative matching” has been coined by Gary Becker (1973), and it
alludes to a relationship (either positive or negative) between characteristics of spouses. We
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since this is similar in individuals who share the same school experience. Our
idea is that the presence of assortative matching may cause over-education.
We build up a model where individuals differ in ability. They study and
are matched in the working period with a partner, who can be a colleague
or a spouse. The partner’s ability positively affects the individual’s utility.
This may be due to a variety of reasons. An individual can benefit from
a colleague by informal apprenticeship, appraising or good influence, and
from a spouse by sharing interests and income. Individuals maximise their
expected utility by choosing their education levels and taking into account
their matching.
This can be random or assortative. Random matching takes place when
partners meet each other by chance. Assortative matching occurs if an in-
dividual meets the partner at school or university, or in any situation where
the educational level influences the chance of a meeting. Whether matching
is assortative depends on the institutions and tradition of a society: for ex-
ample, the more the educational system requires that students spend time
together, the more likely the matching will be assortative.
Our results suggest that assortative matching makes the education ac-
quired inefficient from a social point of view. In particular, individuals would
reach a lower level of education in a socially optimal solution. Thus we define
over-education as the difference between the actual level of education and the
socially optimal level of education.
What determines these results? Assortative matching gives an incentive
to study more in order to increase the partner’s quality. However, every indi-
vidual with the same level of ability acquires the same quantity of education
and hence is matched with a partner of the same type. This approach is in
the spirit of Akerlof (1976), where workers signal their ability through their
work speed. In order to look more able, workers of a given ability work faster
refer to the similarities in the levels of education specifically, and we apply the relationship
not only to spouses, but also to colleagues.
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than they would if they were not observed. In our model, individuals observe
the partner’s education level as a signal of ability, and in order to look more
able they acquire more education than they would if assortative matching
were not present.
The paper considers next how the introduction of a progressive income
tax aiming to correct over-education may influence the incentives to acquire
education. Interestingly, tax progression blunts the educational incentive for
high-ability individuals but improves it for individuals with lower ability.
To test the theoretical model, we use the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) for years 1991-2006. Because of the lack of information on the
educational levels of colleagues, we analyse assortative matching only for
couples and we consider a sample of spouses or long-term partners. We
define as over-educated individuals whose educational qualification exceeds
the required qualification in their occupation. Then, we test for a relationship
between over-education and assortative matching, determined by a positive
correlation in partners’ levels of education. Our empirical findings support
the theoretical results.
To our knowledge, over-education has not been largely developed from a
theoretical perspective, with few notable exceptions. Frank (1978) investi-
gates the differentials in wages between men and women as a consequence of
female over-qualification. This is caused by family location decisions, since a
family is more likely to move if it is the husband that acquires a better job,
sacrificing the wife’s opportunities. Hence the role differences between men
and women are essential for his results, and over-education is generated by a
job search process. Compared to this work, we do not consider differences in
wages among sexes, job search nor the different role in society between men
and women.
Our results are also linked to Lommerud (1989), where over-education
occurs as individuals care about social status, determined by the relative
income. As in our paper, he corrects over-education through a progressive
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income taxation. This can weaken the incentive to study, since acquiring
education becomes more costly. Subsidies might be necessary to restore this
incentive.
Konrad and Lommerud (2000) explain over-education through a house-
hold bargaining model where young individuals separately choose their level
of education and, once married, they sacrifice their returns to education in
favour of an optimal level of family public goods (i.e., to spend time with
children, partner, and so on). Over-education emerges because the educa-
tional decisions affect the threat point (i.e., the reservation utility given by
being single) of spouses. To over-invest in education is inefficient in order
to optimise the quantity of the family public good, but leads to an increase
in the threat point so as to be in an advantaged position in the household
bargaining.
As with studies by Peters and Siow (2001), Baker and Jacobsen (2005),
Iyigun and Walsh (2005), Chiappori et al.(2006) and Nosaka (2007), our
paper shares the link between education and assortative matching, whilst
they consider assortative matching only between spouses. Our theoretical
contribution is to address this link as an explanation for over-education.
Finally, the paper is related to the empirical literature of over-education
(for discussions, see Hartog, 2000 and McGuinness, 2006). In particular,
Lindley and McIntosh (2009) have studied over-education using the BHPS
but identify over-education as the distance between the individual’s job and
the mode highest qualification in each occupation. Unlike them, we classify
jobs as “graduate”, “non-graduate” and “no qualification” jobs and to see
whether a match exists with the educational qualification acquired. As far
as we know, our empirical analysis is the first that examines assortative
matching as a possible cause of over-education.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
the model. Section 3 shows the results. Section 2.4 analyses the educational
incentives given by progressive taxation on income. Section 5 presents the
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empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
There is a continuum of individuals5 normalised to 1. Individuals differ in
ability, denoted by θ ∈ [θ, θ] and distributed according to density f (θ) with
cumulative distribution function F (θ). We refer to ability as every innate
characteristic that contributes to income potential. Individuals choose their
level of education. We denote as e ≥ 0 the quantity of education acquired
by an individual. Education is costly for individuals. We denote the utility
cost of education as c
2
e2, with c > 0.
After deciding their education, individuals work and are matched with a
partner. We denote as eθ the income of an individual with education e and
ability θ. The partner can be seen as a colleague or a spouse. An individual
benefits from the partner’s quality6. This is represented by αθp, where α ∈
[0, 1] is the relative importance of the partner’s quality in determining the
individual’s utility, while θp ∈ [θ, θ] denote the partner’s ability. Thus an
individual’s utility is determined by7:
U (e, θ, θp) = eθ + αθp − c
2
e2. (1)
We analyse the matching technology and then the educational problem.
5We do not consider differences in sex. This implies that men and women behave
symmetrically, and excludes the case (more credible in reality) that educational decisions
change according to sex (due to a different role in society and household, childbearing and
so forth). However, the message of the paper does not change by considering differences
in sex and these would only complicate the analysis.
6In teamwork, individuals find the performance of their duties easier if those they co-
operate with are able, competent and dedicated. In individual jobs, a good environment
improves job performance through suggestions or discussions. In love life, individuals share
the advantages of a more able spouse: a better income, work flexibility (which reflects more
availability in the spare time), a more interesting conversation and more open mindedness.
7We assume a linear additive utility in order to keep the analysis tractable. Different
formulations would complicate the algebra without adding much insight.
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2.1 Matching
Matching can be of two types: random or assortative. A random matching
occurs when partners meet each other by chance. Within this framework,
random matching happens anytime a meeting takes place in situations that
are unrelated to the acquired education. For example, a match between a
lawyer and a labourer sharing the passion for football and playing in the
same team is totally casual. Two individuals meeting at the supermarket
can have completely different educational backgrounds.
Assortative matching occurs when an individual meets their partner at
school, university or in any situation where the educational level influences
the chance of a meeting. For example when individuals attend the same
social environment given by previous school friendships, or when a certain
activity is related to the studies attended, like individuals with a degree
in arts meeting in a museum or in an exhibition, and so on. In all these
cases, partners’ education is positively related. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that with assortative matching, a perfect positive correlation exists
in partners’ levels of education. In other words, the partner of an individual
who acquires education e has the same level of education e. Considering an
imperfect correlation would not alter our results.
Let β ∈ [0, 1] denote the exogenous probability that the matching is as-
sortative. This is independent of the individual’s ability θ. The value of β
depends on the customs and the educational system of the society we are con-
sidering. For instance, the more an educational system requires that students
spend years at school for obtaining a certain qualification, the greater the
probability of assortative matching8. Another example is the role of school
tracking, that is the separation of pupils by academic ability into groups
for all subjects within a school (Gamoran, 1992). An educational system
8Blossfeld and Timm (2003) analyse the relationship between educational system and
marital assortative matching in many western countries. Their results show that the more
time individuals spend at school, the greater the chance of marrying a partner with similar
education (i.e., the higher β).
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that postpones school tracking keeps a more heterogeneous group of pupils
together for a long time, decreasing the probability of assortative matching9.
2.2 Educational choice
When individuals decide the quantity of education to acquire, the future
matching affects their decisions. According to equation (1), they prefer to
be matched with a high-quality partner, as this increases their benefit. With
random matching, since there is no correlation in partners’ education, indi-
viduals have no information about partners’ characteristics during the ed-
ucational decisions. Thus partners’ expected quality is determined by the
average individual type, θp =
θ∫
θ
θpf(θp)dθp, and hence random matching does
not influence the educational choice.
With assortative matching instead, individuals can observe the education
of some of their potential partners (for example, their school friends) during
their educational period. Thus they may want to acquire more education
in order to improve the probability of being matched with a better partner.
Consequently, it is possible to influence the expected partner’s type through
the educational decisions.
In particular, individuals can correctly infer a partner’s ability through
their education. This is shown by supposing E (θp) being the education
of a partner with ability θp, and also that
10 E ′ (θp) > 0. The fact that
9Holmlund (2006) studies the effects of a school reform on marital assortative matching.
She examines an educational reform, implemented in Sweden in the 1950s and 60s, which
postponed tracking and extended compulsory education from seven to nine years. Her
results show that this might have resulted in a reduction in assortative matching.
10In practice, we are arguing that the belief in equilibrium is that education is an
increasing and monotonic function of ability. In other words, individuals believe that the
abler ones study more. The equilibrium that emerges is “separating” (i.e., the level of
education will be different for each level of ability). This does not exclude the existence of
other equilibria that are determined by different beliefs. For instance, if the belief is that
the level of education is constant irrespective of the individuals’ ability, then a pooling
equilibrium must emerge. However, the belief we focus on looks more consistent to what
happens in reality.
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in equilibrium, education is a strictly increasing function of ability allows
the individual to recognise their partner’s ability through his/her education.
From a technical perspective, this happens because an increasing function can
be inverted11. Given the assumption that in assortative matching partners
have the same level of education, then an individual with ability θ acquiring
an amount of education e will be matched with a partner whose education
is e = E (θp). Hence the individual can infer the partner’s ability θp as the
inverse image of E (θp), so θp = E
−1 (e). If this holds, we can rewrite equation
(1) as:
eθ + α
(1− β) θ∫
θ
θpf(θp)dθp + βE
−1 (e)
− c
2
e2. (2)
In equilibrium we consider, all type e individuals make identical choices,
and so (2) is the expected utility in each individual type e. The first part of
(2) is the total benefit given by the individual’s income, the second part is
the total benefit given by the partner’s quality, and the third part is the total
cost of education. The second part of (2) can be in turn decomposed into
two parts: (i) α(1− β)
θ∫
θ
θpf(θp)dθp, and (ii) αβE
−1(e), which represent the
expected benefit given by the partner with random and assortative matching,
respectively.
Equation (2) shows that, in the presence of assortative matching, the
educational choice e influences not only the future income (eθ) but also the
partner’s expected quality (βE−1(e)). In particular, an individual tries to
manipulate the education signal by acquiring more education than others
of similar ability, in order to obtain, in the future, a partner with higher
ability than his/her. But in equilibrium, every individual takes into account
assortative matching and tries to do precisely this, hence with probability β
everyone is matched with a partner of the same ability.
11Clearly we need to verify that in equilibrium this condition holds.
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The first order condition for the maximisation of equation (2) is:
θ + αβ
d
de
E−1 (e)− ce = 0. (3)
The following lemma shows the solution of equation (3).
Lemma 1 The level of education chosen by type θ in equilibrium is eov =
αβ + θ
c
.
Proof. Since an individual with ability θ acquires a level of education e and
with assortative matching a partner with ability θp = E
−1 (e) acquires an
amount of education e too, then necessarily θp = θ. Hence we can substitute
12
θ = E−1 (e) in equation (3). This is a differential equation which has solution:
d
de
E−1 (e) =
ce− E−1 (e)
αβ
. (4)
We consider a linear solution E−1 (e) = Ae+B. By substituting this in (4)
we obtain A = c and B = −αβc. Hence E−1 (e) = ce− αβc. By explicating
e, noting that E−1 (e) = θ, so we can rewrite e = αβ + θ
c
. In order eov to
be invertible, it needs to be a strictly increasing function. Differentiating eov
with respect to θ yields ∂
∂θ
(αβ + θ
c
) = 1
c
> 0.
3 Theoretical results
In the equilibrium presented in the previous section, a part of the education
acquired by individuals is to improve the quality of the potential partner.
But since everyone does this, the expected quality of partners does not im-
prove. Thus although individuals choose their optimal amount of education,
12Note that we can substitute E−1(e) = θ only once that e has been maximised. If we
do it before the maximisation is like to keep as fixed the partner’s education. But this is
a simultaneous game where every individual is also a partner, so the result would not be
a Nash equilibrium.
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the overall education is not socially efficient. Indeed the part acquired for
increasing the chance of a better potential partner is not helpful in it, and is
therefore wasted.
In this section we investigate the equilibrium where individuals exploit
the socially optimal educational resources. We assume that education is
determined by a planner aiming to maximise social welfare. This is given by
the unweighted sum of the individual utilities when β = 0:
W =
θ∫
θ
θ + α θ∫
θ
θpf(θp)dθp − c
2
e2
 dθ.
In other words, the social welfare function considered does not take into
account assortative matching, in order to rule out the cause of inefficiency
from the problem. For every θ, the social planner’s problem is the maximi-
sation of equation (2) when β = 0.
The solution of Lemma 1 becomes e∗ = θ
c
. In order to have over-
education, it is necessary that eov > e
∗, αβ + θ
c
> θ
c
, which is always verified
since αβ > 0. This is intuitive. In the presence of assortative matching, indi-
viduals observe the potential partners’ education and try to look more able.
This extra amount of education is not considered by the social planner. Indi-
viduals obtain the same result in terms of optimal choice (i.e., same income
and partner), but employing less educational resources than in the presence
of assortative matching and thus optimising social welfare (Figure 1). Hence
we refer to e∗ as the first best equilibrium. Over-education is defined as the
difference between eov and e
∗.
Definition 1 ∆e = αβ is the level of over-education.
By looking at ∆e, we can observe that an increase either in β or in the
relative importance of the partner’s quality α leads to an increase in over-
education. Clearly the more education individuals acquire, the more likely
they are to meet their partner among their school friends (β high). Also, they
11
invest more in education if α is high, since having a high-quality partner is
more valuable. This leads to more over-education.
Figure 1. Over-education.
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4 Educational Incentives
In this section, we examine how a public intervention aiming to erase over-
education can influence educational incentives. We assume that there is
a government that fights over-education through a progressive taxation on
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income. We strongly assume that the government is able to perfectly dis-
criminate taxation according to the individual type. This indeed implies that
the government can observe individuals’ ability, which is clearly not possi-
ble in reality. Although this analysis does not yield normative implications,
nevertheless it allows us to highlight some properties of progressive taxation
on education incentives in the presence of assortative matching.
With progressive taxation, the tax rate increases the higher the income.
We denote it as τ = γ2
(
1− eθL
eθ
)
∈ [0, 1], where γ 6= 1 represents the tax
progression and eθL is the lowest income in the population considered (the
income of the least able individuals). For every θ, equation (2) becomes:
eθ
(
1− γ2
(
1− eθL
eθ
))
+ α
(1− β) θ∫
θ
θpf(θp)dθp + β
(
αE−1 (e)
)− c
2
e2.
(5)
The first order condition for the maximisation of (5) is:
θ + βα
d
de
E−1 (e) = ce+ γ2θ, (6)
and the level of education is determined by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 With a progressive tax on income, the education in equilibrium is
eτ =
θ(1−γ2)
c
+ αβ
(1−γ2) .
Proof. We substitute θ = E−1 (e) in equation (6). This is a differential
equation which has solution:
d
de
E−1 (e) =
ce+ (γ2 − 1)E−1 (e)
αβ
. (7)
We consider a linear solutions E−1 (e) = Ae+B. By substituting this in
(7) we obtain A = c
1−γ2 and B =
αβc
(1−γ2)2 . Hence E
−1 (e) = ce
1−γ2 − αβc(1−γ2)2 . By
explicating e and noting that E−1 (e) = θ, we can rewrite e =
θ(1−γ2)
c
+ αβ
(1−γ2) .
Note that γ cannot be 1, in order to have determinate solutions.
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To reach the first best level of education, eτ needs to be equal to e∗, thus:
θ(1−γ2)
c
+ αβ
(1−γ2) =
θ
c
. By explicating γ we find two positive solutions γ1 =(
1
2
+
(θ2−4αβcθ)
1
2
2θ
) 1
2
and γ2 =
(
1
2
− (θ
2−4αβcθ)
1
2
2θ
) 1
2
. The necessary condition
to define the solutions as real numbers is that c < θ
4αβ
. We keep γ2 because
it is the lowest solution, in order to have less distortion.
Lemma 3 For c < θ
4αβ
, The optimal progressive income tax is τ ∗ = (γ∗)2(
1− eθL
eθ
)
, where γ∗ =
(
1
2
− (θ
2−4αβcθ)
1
2
2θ
) 1
2
.
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium where the progressive income tax is levied.
At a first glance, these results may justify the introduction of income progres-
sive taxation on efficiency grounds, with no appeal to equity or redistributive
reasons. Most interesting, through this result we can study the effects of in-
come tax progression γ on the educational incentives. This is shown by the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 For individuals with ability higher than αβc
(γ2−1)2 , a more pro-
gressive income taxation makes the incentive to acquire education diminish.
For individuals with ability lower or equal to αβc
(γ2−1)2 , a more progressive in-
come taxation makes the incentive to acquire education increase.
Proof. Differentiation of eτ with respect to γ yields ∂e
τ
∂γ
= 2αβ γ
(γ2−1)2 − 2cθγ.
This is positive if θ < αβc
(γ2−1)2 and negative otherwise.
An increase in tax progression has ambiguous effects on the incentives of
acquiring education, according to the individual’s ability. As tax progression
increases, individuals with higher ability have less incentives in acquiring
education while individuals with lower ability have more incentives.
The reason is the following. An increase in progressive taxation lowers
the incentive in acquiring education for the purpose of increasing income, but
gives more incentive in acquiring education to improve the partner’s quality.
14
Figure 2. Progressive taxation.
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This second effect occurs since tax progression makes every individual
have a relative advantage in acquiring education for improving the partner’s
quality compared to other individuals with higher ability. In other words,
given the fact that the benefit obtained by the partner is the same for every
individual (since it does not depend on the ability), to acquire education for
improving this benefit is less costly the lower the individual’s ability because
taxation increases with ability.
The first effect is stronger the higher the individual’s ability, while the
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second effect is identical for each individual. Consequently, when ability is
high, the first effect more than offsets the second effect, and vice versa when
ability is low.
This result can be compared with Lommerud (1989), where over-education
is caused by social status (represented by the relative income). In Lommerud,
progressive income taxation corrects over-education but blunts the incentive
to undertake education irrespective of the ability level.
5 Empirical analysis
In this section we test the implications of the theoretical model by examining
empirically whether assortative matching may cause over-education.
5.1 Data
The dataset used in our analysis is the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). This is a nationally representative random sample survey of house-
holds in Britain, which started in 1991. The BHPS was designed as an annual
survey of each adult (16+) member of a sample of more than 5,000 house-
holds, making a total of approximately 10,000 individual interviews. The
same individuals are interviewed in successive waves and, if they leave their
original households, all adult members of their new households will also be
interviewed.
Within the BHPS there is no information about the relationship between
the level of education of colleagues. This does not allow us to consider assor-
tative matching at work. Thus our empirical analysis focuses on assortative
matching between couples.
We study a sample for years 1991-2006, including 20784 couples (41568
individuals) of men and women aged13 between 21 and 65 years who pro-
13We do not take into account individuals aged below 21 because, according to the
British university system, they might not have had the opportunity to complete their
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vided complete information at the interview dates, who are married or in a
relationship and live in the same household14.
5.2 Dependent variable: over-education
An individual is over-educated if his or her educational qualification exceeds
the required qualification in her occupation.
Empirical work has relied on four approaches of measuring over-education.
In one approach, education is compared to the self-assessed qualification re-
quired to perform one’s job (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981, Hartog and Tsang,
1987, Sicherman, 1991, Alba-Ramirez, 1993, Green et al., 2000). Another
way is to calculate the distribution of education for each occupation; em-
ployees who exceed the mean, median or mode by more than some ad hoc
value (generally one standard deviation) are classified as over-educated (Ve-
dugo and Verdugo, 1989, Groot and Massen van den Brink, 1995, Lindley and
McIntosh, 2009). A third strategy is to consider a measure of over-education
based on whether the graduate is satisfied with the match between her edu-
cation and her occupation. Graduates in a sub-graduate occupation who are
satisfied are defined as “apparently” over-educated, whereas those who are
dissatisfied are called genuinely over-educated (Chevalier, 2000). In a fourth
approach, the educational requirement is a systematic evaluation who spec-
ifies the required level of education for any occupational qualification based
on the the American classification “Dictionary of Titles” (Thurow and Lucas,
1972, Hatrog, 1980, Rumberger, 1987, Kiker and Santos, 1991, Oosterbeek
and Webbink, 1996).
All these strategies are not fully satisfying in our analysis, for a variety
of reasons. The BHPS does not have any worker self-assessment about the
education required for the job. Moreover, such a definition of over-education
higher education.
14In order to build up a sample of only couples, we keep individuals who live with the
partner. In the case that the partner is not participating to the interview, the observation
is dropped.
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relies on employees accurately reporting the skills required for their job. Also
and more importantly, this measure is based on the ability of an employee to
match a specific level of skills with a qualification level. Finally, employees
might report the current hiring standards, which in the presence of qualifica-
tion inflation or grade drift will bias the over-education measure upward. The
distribution of education in each occupation does not seem a good measure,
since it is based on the observed distribution of education for a given occupa-
tion, it is sensitive to cohort effects, especially in the case of a rapid change
in the educational level required to perform in a given occupation. The defi-
nition of over-education based on the subjective individual’s job satisfaction
excludes objectivity to the measure.
Occupations in the BHPS are not classified with a Dictionary of Titles,
however jobs are sorted through the Standard Occupational Classification
(SOC). By considering it, it seems consistent to evaluate in a clear way which
educational qualification is required by any job. In particular, all the profes-
sions between 100 and 299 are managerial, professional (sollicitors, chartered
accountants, engineers...) or academic jobs (physicists, psychologists,...). It
is straightforward to think that to do these profession a university degree is
required. Therefore we denote those as “graduate” jobs. All the occupations
between 300 and 499 are technical or clerical jobs, that is occupations requir-
ing a secondary school degree. We denote those activities as “non-graduate”
jobs. Finally, all the occupations equal or above 500 are manual jobs that
generally do not require any educational qualification. We refer to those as
“non qualified” jobs.
We then rearrange educational qualifications with the same measurement
scale and examining when a match occurs. We refer to every academic quali-
fication as “graduate” , to the CSE, GCE, GCSE, A level15 and every Scottish
15The “Certificate of Secondary Education”and the “General Certificate of Educa-
tion”are secondary education degrees replaced in the late 1980s by the GCSE in England,
Wales and Northern Ireland. The “General Certificate of Secondary Education”is the ed-
ucational qualification for students aged 14-16 in England,Wales and Northern Ireland.
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equivalent16 as “non-graduate” . Finally, we refer to apprentice qualification
or no qualification whatsoever as “non-qualified” .
Over-education occurs when an individual has a graduate qualification
and a non-graduate/non-qualified job, or a non-graduate qualification and a
non-qualified job.
5.3 Explanatory variables
The key explanatory variable is assortative matching. We proxy assortative
matching through the positive relationship in the partners’ education. In
particular, we consider the rearrangement of the educational classification
as “graduate”, “non-graduate”and “non qualified” already adopted to iden-
tify over-education. Hence, in our identification assortative matching occurs
when two partners’ have the same level of education according to this scale.
The control variables are sex, age, age squared, regions, years of work,
job satisfaction by type of work and number of workers in the firm. The
variable sex takes values of zero for men and one for women.
As for regions we consider five macro areas: Northern England, Mid-
dle England, Southern England, Scotland and Wales. We exclude from
the analysis individuals from Northern Ireland, for the strong segregation in
marriages between Catholics and between Protestants in this area (Jerkins,
1997), which may cause distortions in the analysis of assortative matching.
The years of work represent the work experience of an individual, and
measure whether over-education can be a long run phenomenon, as might be
in the case that an experienced worker is also over-educated.
The “Advanced Level General Certificate of Education”is the educational qualification for
students aged 16-18 and is the standard entry qualification for assessing the suitability for
applicants for academic courses in English, Welsh and Northern Irish universities.
16In terms of educational system, the UK Government is responsible for England, and
the Scottish Government, the Welsh Assembly Government and the Northern Ireland
Executive are responsible for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, respectively. While
the systems in England, Wales and Northern Ireland are more similar, the Scottish system
is quite different.
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The BHPS asks to rate the satisfaction by “job type”. The worker gives
a number from 1 to 7, where 1 corresponds to “not satisfied at all” and 7 is
“completely satisfied”. Finally, the variable “number of workers” can take
the value 1 if in the firm there are less than 100 employees, 2 if there are
from 100 to 999 employees and 3 if there are 1000 or more employees.
We could have included more control variables17. Nonetheless, this would
have greatly reduced the number of observations. Another drawback in our
identification strategy is given to the lack of information in the BHPS on
individuals’ ability. Finally, the BHPS does not give information on whether
partners meet at or attended the same school. These limitations do not offset
the great advantages in using the BHPS for our analysis, given by the large
number of observations, and by the partner’s information which allow us to
control for assortative matching.
5.4 Descriptive analysis
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of men and women.
The mean of over-education is 0.561 for men and 0.516 for women. As-
sortative matching occurs for the 53% of couples of our sample. The average
age is around 40 years for men and 38 for women.
The majority of couples (about 31%) are from Southern England and the
minority are from Wales (about 11%). Job satisfaction is slightly higher for
women (5.537 out of 7) than for men (5.381). Men have on average more
than five years of work experience while women have more than four years.
Finally, the average number of employees in a firm is less than 100.
17Lindley and McIntosh (2009) use the BHPS and, unlike our approach, they include
also single individuals, which allows them to use more control variables and keep a higher
number of observations. In particular, they consider the presence of children in the house-
hold, whether the spouse is employed, if the individual is a union member, if his or her
job is permanent or part-time, the promotion prospects, if the individual had a training
period in the last year, the commute time and the reason for moving.
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Table 1. Descriptive analysis.
Variable Men Women
Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max
Over-education 0.561 0.496 0 1 0.516 0.499 0 1
(No=0; Yes=1)
Assortative matching 0.536 0.498 0 1 0.536 0.498 0 1
(No=0; Yes=1)
Age 40.554 9.983 21 65 38.845 9.844 21 65
Regions
Wales 0.113 0.316 0 1 - - - -
Scotland 0.162 0.368 0 1 - - - -
Southern England 0.315 0.464 0 1 - - - -
Middle England 0.151 0.358 0 1 - - - -
Northern England 0.248 0.431 0 1 - - - -
Job information
Satisfaction by job type 5.381 1.342 1 7 5.537 1.302 1 7
(Not at all=1; Complete=7)
Years of work 5.522 6.548 0 50 4.555 5.200 0 37
Number at workplace 1.572 0.678 1 3 1.481 0.677 1 3
(1-99=1; 100-999=2; 1000 or more=3)
Observations 20400 20400
5.5 Empirical Model
Following the existing literature on mismatch between education and job, we
estimate the following equation:
Oit = βxit + γassortativeit + εit,
where the discrete variable Oit measures the presence of over-education,
the vector xit contains the control variables for individual i at time t. The
variable assortativeit identifies assortative matching for individual i at time t.
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What we expect is that over-education increases with assortative matching.
We compare the random with the fixed effects logit18 model by performing
a Hausman test. We develop the analysis separately for men and women, in
order to control for differences by gender.
5.6 Empirical results
Table 2 shows the empirical results. The Hausman test tells us that the fixed
effects is the most appropriate model for our analysis. Thus in this paragraph
we will discuss those results only. This comes at a cost, since the fixed effects
model drops all the observations with no variation along the years. As a
consequence, the number of men and women is asymmetric and much lower
than the original sample considered.
The coefficient on age is negative for both groups at an increasing rate.
This can be interpreted in different ways. First, over-education falls as job
experience increases. Second, over-education is a recent issue and it did
not involve older generations. Our results below on the positive correlation
between over-education and job experience suggest that the second interpre-
tation fits better with our results.
Regions are generally not significant in explaining over-education. Excep-
tions are a positive correlation between Scotland and male over-education and
between Midlands and female over-education. As expected, job satisfaction
by work type looks to be negatively correlated to over-education, although
it is not significant.
18Note that it is not possible to perform a fixed-effects probit model. Indeed, there
does not exist a sufficient statistic allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the
likelihood. Possible alternatives, such as the unconditional fixed-effects probit models, are
biased. Lindley and McIntosh (2009) consider a vector of individual-level mean variables
for all the socio-economics characteristics contained in their control variables to proxy the
fixed effects contained in the error term.
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Table 2. Over-education.
Variable RE FE
Men Women Men Women
Age - 0.241 *** - 0.101 *** - 0.278 *** - 0.119 ***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.037)
Age squared 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regions (dummy variable omitted: Southern England)
Wales 0.497 ** 0.974 *** - 0.426 0.635
(0.214) (0.242) (0.407) (0.571)
Scotland 0.467 ** 0.702 *** 1.243 *** - 0.400
(0.196) (0.215) (0.452) (0.483)
Middle England 0.233 0.819 *** 0.033 0.842 **
(0.197) (0.207) (0.317) (0.321)
Northern England 0.043 0.370 ** 0.066 0.347
(0.172) (0.183) (0.286) (0.298)
Job Information
Satisfaction by job type - 0.052 ** - 0.050 ** - 0.025 - 0.024
(Not at all=1; Complete=7) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Years of work 0.015 ** - 0.031 *** 0.020 *** - 0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Number at workplace - 0.011 - 0.089 0.065 - 0.136 **
(1-99=1; 100-999=2; more=3) (0.052) (0.054) (0.056) (0.058)
Assortative matching 0.127 0.260 *** 0.274 *** 0.248 ***
(No=0; Yes=1) (0.084) (0.083) (0.093) (0.088)
Log likelihood - 8840.7775 - 8878.5679 - 3265.3057 - 3125.76
LR chi2 - - 94.25 253.90
Wald chi2 169.87 68.94 - -
(Prob>chi2) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman - - 253.94 *** 410.74 ***
Observations 20400 20400 8206 8181
Notes: the dependent variable is over-education.Values of standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively.
In contrast to other results in the same dataset (Lindley and McIntosh,
2009), we found a positive correlation between the likelihood of male over-
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education and job experience19. According to this, over-education may not
be a temporary phenomenon whilst individuals acquire the necessary expe-
rience to obtain a job commensurate with their qualification. However, this
correlation is negative for women, although not significant. The number of
employees seems negatively related to female over-education.
Finally, over-education appears to be positively correlated to assortative
matching. This is strongly significant both for men and women. Thus the
empirical results might confirm that assortative matching may cause over-
education.
6 Concluding remarks
In the presence of assortative matching, individuals increase their education
to improve the quality of colleagues or spouses. But as everyone is more
educated, the extra education acquired does not improve the chance of a
good match. Hence over-education emerges, since individuals can obtain
the same result in terms of optimal choice but exploiting less educational
resources. We test the model using the British Household Panel Survey for
years 1991-2006. Our empirical results support the theoretical finding that
assortative matching may cause over-education.
An interesting extension of the paper may be to consider assortative
matching in terms of social class. Although educational and social class as-
sortative matching are positively correlated, individuals with different social
backgrounds may acquire the same level of education. Introducing assor-
tative matching by social class may have different effects according to the
social group we regard. On the one hand, the opportunity cost to acquire
more education is generally higher for advantaged individuals since, for in-
stance, they may have better job opportunities through the parental network.
On the other hand, this can strengthen the effect on over-education for dis-
19The difference in our results lies in the different approach in measuring over-education.
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advantaged people, as assortative matching by class is a further barrier in
the attempt to improve the matching through education. The introduction
of assortative matching by social class is left for future work.
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